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Introduction 
 As with many of humanity’s attempts to characterize and label people, places, 
and actions, the limits and extent of “West Africa” as a region are not perfect and are 
subject to debate. Though there is a common “core” of sixteen countries, the borders of 
this region are not definite. The United Nations defines the West African region as the 
middle picture below, with its borders being Mauritania in the northwest, Niger in the 
northeast, Nigeria in the southeast, and the Atlantic Ocean providing the border in the 
southwest. The maps on the left and right depict other common demarcations of the 
region.  
 
 
 
 The climate, peoples, and traditions within this region of 396,000,000 people 
(Worldometers 2019) are incredibly diverse, as anyone who has studied a geographic 
region could guess. In the north, the Sahara Desert looms large and imposing, slowly 
expanding every year. Just below it is the Sahel, the “semiarid region of western and 
north-central Africa extending from Senegal eastward to Sudan” (The Editors of 
Encyclopaedia Britannica 2018). Throughout the remainder of West Africa lie plains, 
forests, mountains, rainforests, and coastlands. The main linguistic divide is English and 
French due to approximately a century of colonization, though major European powers 
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attempted to claim African lands all across the continent after the Berlin Conference of 
1884-1885. From that point, the so-called “Scramble for Africa” began in full force, and 
England, France, Germany, Portugal, Spain, Belgium, and Italy raced to claim territory. 
Besides the colonial tongues, hundreds of different languages are spoken from multiple 
language families; some countries, like Cameroon, contain over 250 languages 
themselves (Kouega pp. 3-94). And the region is cut between Muslim, Christian, 
animist, and a mixture of said three religious beliefs.  
 In this Honors Project, my aim is to analyze francophone (French-speaking) and 
anglophone (English-speaking) West Africa in terms of their socioeconomic 
performance, development, and the effects of colonization. As West Africa is too vast to 
examine in its entirety, especially for a project such as this, I have chosen four countries 
in particular to study. Two of them are anglophone (Ghana and Nigeria), and two of 
them are francophone (Cote d’Ivoire and Cameroon). Cameroon also includes English 
as an official language, but it is spoken by a minority in the country and I will expand on 
its particular situation further on in the paper. I will be attempting to “match” Ghana with 
Cote d’Ivoire as well as Nigeria with Cameroon. Comparisons and contrasts will be 
made to determine if any trends of British versus French colonial rule or the overall path 
of development emerge.  
The structure of the project is as follows: 
-Literature Review. I will be reviewing scholarly articles dealing with the subjects studied 
in this research project as well as positioning my project among them. 
-The selection of the countries. This will include the reasoning behind it and some basic 
information. Geography, history, and economy of the country will be discussed. 
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-Comparison, contrast and analysis. I’ll be comparing economic and political indicators 
among the countries, drawing trends, and looking into cause-and-effect relationships. 
-Interviews. I will be interviewing some individuals that are from the selected countries 
to gauge their perceptions and feelings of subjects approached in this project. 
-Findings. I’ll put my main conclusions and findings from the research and analysis in 
this section. 
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Literature Review 
Postcolonial borderland legacies of Anglo-French partition in West Africa by 
William F. S. Miles 
 This article from African Studies Review takes a look at how artificial and sudden 
border creation of English and French colonies in West Africa affected ethnic groups 
that suddenly found themselves split apart. It speaks of general trends but also specific 
ethnic group divisions along the Ghana-Cote d’Ivoire border as well as the Nigeria-
Cameroon border. The article serves to enhance this project by providing insight on the 
differences of colonial administration and the effects on life for the people living under 
their regimes. 
 First and foremost, Miles notes the importance of analyzing the effects (if any) of 
such divisions. He notes the population of former French West Africa (105 million 
people) and British West Africa (207 million) and remarks that, “if French–British 
colonial legacies make a difference, they therefore do so on a very large scale.” If an 
administration helped, hindered, or left a group of people alone, the consequences of 
those actions play a role in the current state of hundreds of millions of people. And Miles 
does insist that there are visible differences via his study of so-called “borderlanders,” or 
ethnic groups split by colonial borders. Indeed, he states that the most important finding 
of the study is that “the significance of colonial and postcolonial superimposition upon 
lived institutional life and the shaping of worldviews has been so pervasive that a 
national qualifier (e.g., Nigérien, Nigerian) must be included in any such 
characterization.” Clear differences exist, then, between these split-up borderlanders. 
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 If Miles had to have picked a colonial empire that was better for the West 
Africans it ruled over, he would have likely have chosen as a result from his research 
the British Empire. He writes that, “Where colonial policies on one side of a line were 
adjudged relatively harsh or unfair, people moved to the other. (This usually meant 
moving from French into British territory).” Additionally, he found that there was 
“indisputable preference for British over French colonialism among the Ewe, who voted 
with their feet by moving in significant numbers from French Togoland into British 
Togoland (incorporated into the Gold Coast in 1957).” Thirdly, he notes that, 
“Centralizing, state-centric administrative policies that perpetuate colonial policies of 
direct rule in Francophone nations, for instance, have suppressed ethnic assertiveness 
more than Anglophone policies have, and thus the Ashanti, Ewe, Hausa, and Yoruba in 
Ghana and Nigeria have fared better than their ethnic cousins in Benin, Togo, and 
Niger.” Tough direct rule in French West Africa appeared to drive people over the 
border into the more lenient indirectly-ruled British West Africa. 
 A final take-away from Postcolonial borderland legacies of Anglo-French partition 
in West Africa is that, as Miles expresses it, “the major postcolonial legacies, however, 
are linguistic, institutional, and economic: the perpetuation of French versus English as 
the official language; distinctive administrative, judicial, and local government systems; 
and parallel economic systems and currencies, which make smuggling a way of life.” 
Here we see the three main effects that shape the lives and future of the people groups 
in West African countries. Borders are such arbitrary, artificial things; yet here, we see 
that they have a very real and visible impact on the lives of those who live within them. 
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What Drives Foreign Direct Investments into West Africa? An Empirical 
Investigation by John C. Anyanwu and Nadege D. Yameogo 
 This article, taken from African Development Review, analyzes the “drives of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) to West Africa using a paneled dataset from 1970 to 
2010.” The authors note the well-known importance of the role of FDI in the 
development of a country, especially for African nations, as it “helps these economies 
move beyond overdependence on natural resources.” As we will see in the section on 
Nigeria, in particular, the country’s massive economy is heavily focused on the oil found 
naturally within the country’s boundaries. Were the oil to suddenly run out, the country’s 
economy would grind to a halt. 
 Moving forward, the authors detail the various reasons transnational corporations 
(TNC) choose to utilize FDI, specifically mentioning the OLI framework (Ownership, 
Location, Internalization). Ownership advantage has to do with “property rights/patents, 
expertise and other intangible assets.” These allow the TNC to retain control of the 
operations in the country as opposed to simply finding and working with a partner who 
may not have similar expectations and aligned goals. Location advantage involves 
“labor advantages, natural resources, trade barriers that restrict imports, gains in trade 
costs and strategic advantages through intangible assets.” Cheap labor, abundant 
resources such as oil, and an openness to foreign business draw in FDI. Finally, 
internalization advantage is “the reduction of uncertainty and transaction costs in order 
to generate knowledge more efficiently.” Having operations in a foreign country allows 
for TNCs to get around some trade barriers or forgeign exchange transaction costs that 
would have arisen via direct exporting or other similar methods. 
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 Following this, the authors conduct a literature review of the relationship between 
FDI and various factors, such as foreign aid and urbanization. They also constructed a 
model that examines this relationship. One of the more interesting results of their model 
is that “there is a negative relationship between FDI inflows to the sub‐region and loan 
component of ODA [Official Development Assistance, or international aid], economic 
growth, level of economic development (real GDP per capita), life expectancy, and 
domestic credit to the private sector.” That is, the higher GDP growth rate (what they 
used to symbolize economic growth), the less FDI a country may receive, ceterus 
paribus. Finally, “real per capita GDP, domestic investment, trade openness, first year 
lag of FDI, natural resources (oil and metals) endowment and exports, and monetary 
integration have a positive and significant effect on FDI inflows to West Africa.” 
 
Foreign Direct Investment Inflow, Volatility, and Domestic Investment in West 
Africa by Eregha, P. B. 
Eregha’s study, focuses on examining “whether the inflow of FDI substitutes or 
complements domestic investment and as well analyzes the possible effect of FDI 
volatility on domestic investment in ECOWAS [Economic Community of West African 
States] countries.” The opening of this article, found in The Journal of Developing 
Areas, begins with an overview of current and recent levels of FDI in Africa in general 
and then West Africa specifically. It notes that while FDI percentages have been 
increasing in Africa, recently, they are still far below other levels of the world. For 
example, “Africa’s share in global inflow of FDI reached 3.1%, 3.9% and 5.2% in 2005, 
2006 and 2008 respectively” whereas “Asia’s share of world FDI inflows was 20.8%, 
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19.3% and 22.9%” in the same time period. Examining West African FDI, the article 
cites that the natural resources sector in West Africa receives nearly two-thirds of FDI in 
the region, followed by 31% in services and 6% in manufacturing. The oil sector in 
Nigeria was noted as receiving the most FDI amongst all countries and sectors in the 
region.  
Eregha then does a detailed literature review on previous academic papers on 
the relationship between FDI and domestic growth or investment. The papers seem split 
on whether FDI “crowds in,” or complements domestic growth, or if it “crowds out,” or 
substitutes domestic growth. After creating his own model accounting for FDI volatility, 
the author finds that “contemporaneous FDI inflow has negative and significant effect on 
domestic investment while the lagged values had positive and insignificant effects. . . a 
one percentage increase in FDI inflow will reduce domestic investment by 0.96 percent 
which is a large negative effect.” This seems to agree with the findings of Anyanwu and 
Yameogo mentioned above. Eregha recommends, from his findings, that FDI be better 
funnelled into West African economies and diversified. If the vast majority of FDI is 
heading towards the oil sector, then dynamic oil prices will make FDI inflows volatile, 
which then has a demonstrated negative effect on domestic growth. 
 
From rivalry to partnership? Critical reflections on Anglo-French cooperation in 
Africa by Cumming, Gordon D. and Chafer, Tony 
 This article, found in Review of International Studies, details the history of Anglo-
French competition between the two powers as well as the more recent cooperation in 
Africa. It begins by noting that rivalry between the UK and France had been around 
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since the nineteenth century, only subsiding and turning into a shaky partnership after 
the Saint-Malo summit of 1998. Both countries used their colonies for their own needs, 
ignoring poverty reduction and welfare for most of the twentieth century. This 
competition was held in check, however, by the need to be on the same side during the 
Cold War as well as the “benign neglect of Africa” on the UK’s part for much of the 
twentieth century. 
 The desire to cooperate, though it may have been vaguely defined in the Saint-
Malo Summit, has begun to increase. Interestingly, some of this Anglo-British 
cooperation is due to both nations preferring each other’s African policies and initiatives 
as opposed to the United States. A main form of teamwork appears to be in the form of 
silent partnership, or “where one donor funds and another agency implements a 
programme.” Cooperation remains limited, however, by a lack of “‘institutional 
mechanisms that bring ministers, officials and institutions together.” Differing overall 
objectives for the continent contribute to the potential discord as well; the authors write 
that “for France, Africa plays a crucial role in enhancing its rank in the international 
pecking order, while for the UK, Africa is much more centrally a development issue.” 
Concluding, Cumming and Chafer claim that “Britain and France have increased, to a 
significant but ultimately limited extent, their collaboration on Africa since Saint-Malo.” 
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Ghana 
 
 
 
Ghana at a glance: (information from CIA World Factbook) 
Capital: Accra 
Independence: 6 March 1957 (from the UK) 
Population: 28,102,471  
Government type: presidential republic 
Legal system: mixed system of English common law and customary law 
Area: 238,533 sq km  
Climate: tropical; warm and comparatively dry along southeast coast; hot and humid in 
southwest; hot and dry in north 
Terrain: mostly low plains with dissected plateau in south-central area 
Natural Resources: gold, timber, industrial diamonds, bauxite, manganese, fish, 
rubber, hydropower, petroleum, silver, salt, limestone 
Population below poverty line: 24.2% (2013 est.) 
Population Distribution: population is concentrated in the southern half of the country, 
with the highest concentrations being on or near the Atlantic coast 
Median Age: 21.2 years 
Ethnic Groups: Akan 47.5%, Mole-Dagbon 16.6%, Ewe 13.9%, Ga-Dangme 7.4%, 
Gurma 5.7%, Guan 3.7%, Grusi 2.5%, Mande 1.1%, other 1.4%(2010 est.) 
Languages: Asante 16%, Ewe 14%, Fante 11.6%, Boron (Brong) 4.9%, Dagomba 
4.4%, Dangme 4.2%, Dagarte (Dagaba) 3.9%, Kokomba 3.5%, Akyem 3.2%, Ga 3.1%, 
other 31.2% (2010 est.) 
Religions: Christian 71.2% (Pentecostal/Charismatic 28.3%, Protestant 18.4%, 
Catholic 13.1%, other 11.4%), Muslim 17.6%, traditional 5.2%, other 0.8%, none 5.2% 
(2010 est.) 
Major Urban Areas: 3.065 million Kumasi, 2.439 million ACCRA (capital), 855,000 
Sekondi Takoradi (2018) 
Life Expectancy: 67.4 years  
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GDP per capita:  
$4,700 (2017 est.) 
$4,500 (2016 est.) 
$4,400 (2015 est.) 
GDP growth rate: 
8.4% (2017 est.) 
3.7% (2016 est.) 
3.8% (2015 est.) 
Industries: mining, lumbering, light manufacturing, aluminum smelting, food 
processing, cement, small commercial ship building, petroleum 
Export (commodities): oil, gold, cocoa, timber, tuna, bauxite, aluminum, manganese 
ore, diamonds, horticultural products 
 
The modern nation-state of Ghana essentially emerged in 1874 when the area 
officially became a colony of Great Britain under the name of “the Gold Coast.” 
However, the region has a substantial history prior to its colonization. As early as the 
ninth century, indigenous kingdoms were known and well established. The most 
prominent of the pre-colonization powers was certainly the Ashanti (or Asante, spellings 
vary) Empire, lasting from around 1670 to 1957, though the last half-century of its life it 
was ruled over as a protectorate by the British.  
Numerous European powers established trading posts, castles and colonies 
along the coastline to facilitate trading and spread their spheres of influence. Gold and 
slaves were some of the main commodities traded. In the mid-to-late nineteenth 
century, Britain established firm control on the coastline of modern Ghana and began 
slowly working their way northward both militarily and peacefully. For nearly a hundred 
years, the Ashanti Empire fought against the British, but by 1900 the British claimed 
victory and solidified their rule over the northern provinces. As the colony became 
consolidated, the “gradual emergence of centralized colonial government brought about 
unified control over local services, although the actual administration of these services 
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was still delegated to local authorities, (Berry 1994)” a prime example of British indirect 
rule.  
In 1957, Ghana became independent from colonial rule, the first country south of 
the Sahara to do so. A tumultuous couple of decades followed, with a military coup and 
several unstable administrations before Ghana’s political climate stabilized in 1981.
 
Gold and cocoa formed a large part of Ghana’s economy in the mid-twentieth century, 
and today mining and agriculture still play a large role in Ghana’s economy. 
Development of these industries as well as manufacturing had very promising potential 
but was often “hampered by a lack of capital” and a “shortage of equipment, skilled 
personnel, and foreign exchange capital (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2020).” Government 
policies to ease doing business and relax strict standards did much to improve the 
economic outlook in the country, and Ghana has recently enjoyed being the fastest 
growing economy in the entire world as of 2019 (Fröhlich 2019). 
 On the political spectrum, Ghana’s relatively long history of peaceful transitions 
of power (especially in regards to West African states) along with concerted efforts to 
preserve citizen’s rights have led to it being a stable and secure country. Unlike earlier 
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struggles to obtain economic capital, Ghana has accumulated masses of social capital - 
the World Bank notes that, “Ghana consistently ranks in the top three countries in Africa 
for freedom of speech and press freedom, with strong broadcast media (World Bank 
2019).” Ghana ranks the highest among the four countries selected in this project in the 
Human Development Index. Ghana aims to achieve status as a developed and 
industrialized country within the next two decades, and if it can continue its economic 
and social progress at its current rate, there is little doubt it will achieve its goal. 
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Cote d’Ivoire 
 
 
 
Cote d’Ivoire at a glance: (information from CIA World Factbook) 
 
Capital: Yamoussoukro (legislative capital), Abidjan (administrative capital) 
Independence: 7 August 1960 (from France) 
Population: 26,260,582 (July 2018 est.) 
Government type: presidential republic 
Legal system: civil law system based on French civil code 
Area: 322,463 sq km  
Climate: tropical along coast, semiarid in far north; three seasons - warm and dry 
(November to March), hot and dry (March to May), hot and wet (June to October) 
Terrain: mostly flat to undulating plains; mountains in northwest 
Natural Resources: petroleum, natural gas, diamonds, manganese, iron ore, cobalt, 
bauxite, copper, gold, nickel, tantalum, silica sand, clay, cocoa beans, coffee, palm oil, 
hydropower 
Population below poverty line: 46.3% (2013 est.) 
Population Distribution: the population is primarily located in the forested south, with 
the highest concentration of people residing in and around the cities on the Atlantic 
coast; most of the northern savanna remains sparsely populated with higher 
concentrations located along transportation corridors 
Median Age: 19.9 years  
Ethnic Groups: Akan 28.8%, Voltaique or Gur 16.1%, Northern Mande 14.5%, Kru 
8.5%, Southern Mande 6.9%, unspecified 0.9%, non-Ivoirian 42.3% (2014 est.) 
Languages: French (official), 60 native dialects of which Dioula is the most widely 
spoken 
Religions: Muslim 42.9%, Catholic 17.2%, Evangelical 11.8%, Methodist 1.7%, other 
Christian 3.2%, animist 3.6%, other religion 0.5%, none 19.1% (2014 est.) 
Major Urban Areas: 4.921 million ABIDJAN (seat of government), 231,000 
YAMOUSSOUKRO (capital) (2018) 
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Life Expectancy: 60.1 years  
GDP per capita:  
$3,900 (2017 est.) 
$3,700 (2016 est.) 
$3,500 (2015 est.) 
GDP growth rate: 
7.8% (2017 est.) 
8.3% (2016 est.) 
8.8% (2015 est.) 
Industries: foodstuffs, beverages; wood products, oil refining, gold mining, truck and 
bus assembly, textiles, fertilizer, building materials, electricity 
Export (commodities): cocoa, coffee, timber, petroleum, cotton, bananas, pineapples, 
palm oil, fish 
 
 Côte d’Ivoire, commonly known as (the) Ivory Coast in anglophone media, finds 
its national origin similar to many other African countries in the region. Before concerted 
European efforts to colonize the country, what is now Cote d’Ivoire was a collection of 
kingdoms based on ethnic and religious lines or unclaimed land. Some of the most 
important include the Baoulé, the Kong, and the Abron. However, compared to other 
neighboring countries such as Ghana with the Ashanti and Fanti Kingdoms, Côte 
d’Ivoire was rather “bereft of any substantial indigenous kingdom or civilization (Miles 
2015).”  
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 In the late 1800s, the French established firm control on the coastland, and soon 
after subjugated the peoples in the North. In 1893, the area officially became the French 
colony of Cote d’Ivoire and by 1914 the entire land was pacified of resistance. French 
rule in the colony was based on the concepts of assimilation and association. 
Assimilation implied “extension of the French language, institutions, laws, and customs” 
while association “affirmed the superiority of the French in the colonies, but it entailed 
different institutions and systems of laws for the colonizer and the colonized (Handloff 
1988).” Other than brief moments where there was a shortage of colonial governors, the 
French ruled directly. Westernized, educated Ivoirians could enjoy equality with their 
French counterparts, but for the most part the common Ivoirian had no real political 
rights and could at any moment be drafted into labor in the mines or serve in France’s 
army. 
 Côte d’Ivoire’s economy was in great shape at independence. The country was 
sending out 40% of all of French West Africa exports. Cocoa and coffee provided the 
flagship products of the country in addition to other agricultural products such as rubber 
and palm oil. Capital flowed in due to political stability and the economic boom. 
Factories began popping up in the country so that businesses could avoid importing 
necessary goods. Côte d’Ivoire’s success could only go on for so long, however; a 
combination of “drought, low commodity prices, and rapidly rising debt (Handloff 1988)” 
brought the economy to its knees. Cocoa prices plummeted, and the country’s lack of 
economic diversification meant that the entire system crashed. GDP fell sharply, and 
throughout the next decade, a roller coaster of economic ups and downs struck the 
country. 
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 In 2002, a civil war lasting nearly five years rocked the country, further inhibiting 
its rebound into a strong and stable state. Rebels held the north of the country until 
2007. As seen with many other West African countries, there is a large difference 
between the northern Sahel regions and the southern coastal regions. A peace 
agreement was reached, but after elections in 2010 were disputed, fighting was 
renewed for four more months. Since this second civil war, the country has been on the 
rebound. As seen later on in figure 4 in the Comparison, Contrast, and Analysis section 
of this paper, many indicators of economic growth, trust, and political stability show that 
Cote d’Ivoire has a bright future ahead of it. Its economy is the second-fastest growing 
in Africa since 2012 and the U.S. Department of State denotes it as offering “fertile soil 
for U.S. investment” in the present and near future. If the country’s elections in 2020 
proceed smoothly, Cote d’Ivoire may finally be able to put its wearied last few decades 
behind it and emerge as a model for other African nations to come.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gagne 20 
 
Nigeria 
 
 
 
Nigeria at a glance: (information from CIA World Factbook) 
 
Capital: Abuja 
Population: 203,452,505 (July 2018 est.) 
Independence: 1 October 1960 (from the UK) 
Government type: federal presidential republic 
Legal system: mixed legal system of English common law, Islamic law (in 12 northern 
states), and traditional law 
Area: 923,768 sq km 
Climate: varies; equatorial in south, tropical in center, arid in north 
Terrain: southern lowlands merge into central hills and plateaus; mountains in 
southeast, plains in north 
Natural Resources: natural gas, petroleum, tin, iron ore, coal, limestone, niobium, lead, 
zinc, arable land 
Population below poverty line: 70% (2010 est.) 
Population Distribution: largest population of any African nation; significant population 
clusters are scattered throughout the country, with the highest density areas being in 
the south and southwest 
Median Age: 18.3 years 
Ethnic Groups: Hausa 27.4%, Igbo (Ibo) 14.1%, Yoruba 13.9%, Fulani 6.3%, Tiv 2.2%, 
Ibibio 2.2%, Ijaw/Izon 2%, Kanuri/Beriberi 1.7%, Igala 1%, other 28.9%, unspecified .2% 
(2013 est.) 
Languages: English (official), Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo (Ibo), Fulani, over 500 additional 
indigenous languages 
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Religions: Muslim 51.6%, Roman Catholic 11.2%, other Christian 35.7%, traditionalist 
.9%, unspecified .5% (2013 est.) 
Major Urban Areas: 13.463 million Lagos, 3.82 million Kano, 3.383 million Ibadan, 
2.919 million ABUJA (capital), 2.343 million Port Harcourt, 1.628 million Benin City 
(2018) 
Life Expectancy: 59.3 years 
GDP per capita:  
$5,900 (2017 est.) 
$6,100 (2016 est.) 
$6,300 (2015 est.) 
GDP growth rate: 
0.8% (2017 est.) 
-1.6% (2016 est.) 
2.7% (2015 est.) 
Industries: crude oil, coal, tin, columbite; rubber products, wood; hides and skins, 
textiles, cement and other construction materials, food products, footwear, chemicals, 
fertilizer, printing, ceramics, steel 
Export (commodities): petroleum and petroleum products 95%, cocoa, rubber (2012 
est.) 
 
Nigeria is Africa’s largest economy with an estimated GDP in 2017 of $376.4 
billion and largest population with around 203 million people.Its GDP is ranked 21st 
among the world countries.  The country’s past follows a similar pattern as Ghana and 
Cote d’Ivoire. Various indigenous kingdoms and empires rose and fell in the many 
centuries before and during the early modern period. Two of the most prominent were 
the Songhai Empire, which stretched from modern-day Senegal to central Nigeria, and 
the Sokoto Caliphate, occupying much of northern Nigeria and some areas in other 
countries. Both of these empires were Islamic in nature, which helps explain Nigeria’s 
(like many other Sahel countries) northern-southern divide of Muslims and Christians. 
When European colonization began in the 1800s, it started on the southern coast and 
worked its way north. By 1903, the Sokoto Caliphate, which also held the largest slave 
population in the world of two million, was beaten by the British and opposition to their 
rule was all but destroyed. 
Gagne 22 
 
Nigeria was divided into northern and southern protectorates. In typical fashion, 
the British exercised indirect rule over the colony, and respected traditional Islamic rule 
in the north. Colonial officials were “instructed to interfere as little as possible with the 
existing order (Metz 1991).” Because of this, slavery in the north was not abolished until 
1936. Eventually, the two protectorates were merged into one colony, and Nigeria 
became independent in 1960. Ethnic and religious tensions in the different regions of 
the country were clear and defined, and throughout most of the years from 1967-1999 
the country was plagued by coups, civil war, and dictatorships, with the power often 
falling into the military’s hands. In 1999, democracy was restored and the political scene 
in Nigeria has been relatively stable since then. 
Nigeria’s vast economy is dominated by oil, with 95% of the country’s exports in 
2012 being petroleum or petroleum products. This wealth of a natural research has 
enriched the country, but corruption and poor management by the government has 
meant that the standard of living has been very slow to rise for the average Nigerian, 
and poverty remains rampant. The CIA World Factbook lists a 2010 estimation that 70% 
of the population is living under the poverty line. This corruption also discourages some 
possible investment. Nigeria also produces a fair amount of cocoa, like its neighbors 
Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire. 
Current major problems for the country include corruption and terrorism. 
Throughout the last couple of decades, Boko Haram has been active in the region, 
specifically the northeast, as the map to the left shows. Over two million Nigerians have 
been internally displaced due to the violence in the country. The Nigerian army has 
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been shown to be ill-equipped and not very effective in the fight against this terrorist 
organization. 
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Cameroon 
 
 
 
Cameroon at a glance: (information from CIA World Factbook) 
 
Capital: Yaounde 
Independence: 1 January 1960 (from French-administered UN trusteeship) 
Population: 25,640,965 (July 2018 est.) 
Government type: presidential republic 
Legal system: mixed legal system of English common law, French civil law, and 
customary law 
Area: 475,440 sq km 
Climate: varies with terrain, from tropical along coast to semiarid and hot in north 
Terrain: diverse, with coastal plain in southwest, dissected plateau in center, mountains 
in west, plains in north 
Natural Resources: petroleum, bauxite, iron ore, timber, hydropower 
Population below poverty line: 30% (2001 est.) 
Population Distribution: population concentrated in the west and north, with the 
interior of the country sparsely populated 
Median Age: 18.6 years 
Ethnic Groups: Cameroon Highlanders 31%, Equatorial Bantu 19%, Kirdi 11%, Fulani 
10%, Northwestern Bantu 8%, Eastern Nigritic 7%, other African 13%, non-African less 
than 1% 
Languages: 24 major African language groups, English (official), French (official) 
Religions: Roman Catholic 38.4%, Protestant 26.3%, other Christian 4.5%, Muslim 
20.9%, animist 5.6%, other 1%, non-believer 3.2% (2005 est.) 
Major Urban Areas: 3.656 million Douala, 3.412 million YAOUNDE (capital) (2018) 
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Life Expectancy: 59.4 years 
GDP per capita:  
$3,700 (2017 est.) 
$3,700 (2016 est.) 
$3,600 (2015 est.) 
GDP growth rate: 
3.5% (2017 est.) 
4.6% (2016 est.) 
5.7% (2015 est.) 
Industries: petroleum production and refining, aluminum production, food processing, 
light consumer goods, textiles, lumber, ship repair 
Export (commodities): crude oil and petroleum products, lumber, cocoa beans, 
aluminum, coffee, cotton 
 
 Finally, we have Cameroon. Just like the other three countries, it has a similar 
historic archetype, though there are some key differences. The most important of the 
pre-colonial indigenous kingdoms were the Sao, who inhabited the northern part of 
present-day Cameroon by Lake Chad in the 9th through 15th centuries, and the Sokoto 
Caliphate, who were mentioned in the Nigeria section. The Caliphate islamicized the 
north of the country, while the coastal areas were exposed to Christian missionaries. 
However, when the “scramble for Africa” was in full effect in the late 19th century, it was 
Germany, not France or the U.K., that claimed Cameroon (then called Kamerun) as a 
colony.  
 During World War I, British and French forces conquered Kamerun and split it 
between themselves, creating the British Cameroons and French Cameroun. French 
Cameroun included the vast majority of the country as it is today. The map to the left 
shows the development of the colony’s ownership. This partition between the English 
and French remained until 1960, when, just like many other West African colonies at 
that time, Cameroon received its independence. Some of the British territories voted to 
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be absorbed into Nigeria, while some remained with the new Cameroonian government.
 
 This linguistic and cultural divide between the majority of now-francophone 
Cameroon and the anglophone minority in west remains an issue of contention. The 
country in its independence declared itself a bilingual state, but French language and 
customs have often been prioritized at the expense of the anglophone minority. 
Common law inspired by England is practiced in anglophone Cameroon, but the 
government has sometimes sent lawyers and judges who only have an understanding 
of French civil law or can only speak French. In education, as well, the government has 
sent teachers who can only speak French or Pidgin English to anglophone schools. 
Official documents, though supposed to be written in French and English, are also often 
only in French. In 2016, the Anglophone Crisis began when “English-speaking lawyers, 
students, and teachers began protesting what they saw as their under-representation in, 
and cultural marginalization by, the central government (Roth 2020).” Within 
anglophone Cameroon, a proto-state known as Ambazonia declared 
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independence,  and since then protests, riots, and armed conflicts have taken place in 
this region. 
 Cameroon boasts a fairly diversified economy. While a majority of its exports are 
oil, like Nigeria, it only makes up 40% of its overall exports. Agriculture and forestry 
remain an important part of the economy. Agriculture in particular attracts much 
investment. However, Cameroon’s economy is noticeably struggling. The 2019 U.S. 
Department of State Investment Climate Statement notes that, “Cameroon’s ranking in 
the World Bank’s 2019 Doing Business Report – 166th out of 190 countries – and 
Transparency International’s 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index – 152nd out of 175 
countries – accurately reflect a business climate growing more difficult.” Corruption, 
poverty, and poor infrastructure are common problems. Additionally, like Nigeria, the 
Cameroonian government has been fighting with Boko Haram in the north of the 
country. If Cameroon wishes to emerge from poverty and join the ranks of developed 
countries, it has much political, social, and economic to do. 
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Comparison, Contrast, and Analysis 
 
Figure 1: Human Development Index 
Rank  Country  HDI  LifeExpec*  ExpecYrS MeanYrS GNIpc ($) 
142 Ghana 0.596 63.8 11.5 7.2 4,099 
165 Côte d’Ivoire 0.516 57.4 9.6 5.2 3,589 
158 Nigeria 0.534 54.3 9.7 6.5 5,086 
150 Cameroon 0.563 58.9 12.7 6.3 3,291 
 
Human Development Index 
HDI = Human Development Index 
 The HDI was created to “emphasize that people and their capabilities should be 
the ultimate criteria for assessing the development of a country, not economic growth 
alone” (Human Development Reports 2019). 
LifeExpec = Life Expectancy - values differ depending on what year and what source is 
used; HDI uses Life Expectancy data from UN Population Division in the UN 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs while other sources may use data from the 
World Bank, for example. Source values differ based on data availability, assessment, 
and methods and protocols. 
ExpecYrS = Expected Years in School 
MeanYrS = Mean Years in School 
GNIpc ($) = Gross National Income per capita in USD 
 The Human Development Index (HDI) of each of the four countries tells us not 
only how they compare to each other, but also how West Africa is faring compared to 
the rest of the world. As we can see from the data, Ghana ranks the highest in regard to 
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the HDI, followed by Cameroon, Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire. Ghana beats its “match,” Côte 
d’Ivoire, by over 20 countries. It scored significantly higher in all metrics factoring into 
the HDI. Cameroon edges out Nigeria by 8 spots, out-scoring it in life expectancy and 
expected years in school but still performing worse in mean years in school and GNI. 
No doubt Nigeria’s huge, oil-centered economy allows it to preside over the other 3 
countries in terms of GNI. 
 However, the scores of all four countries are indicative to West (and, by 
extension, most of Subsaharan) Africa’s economic and humanitarian plight. Of the thirty-
six countries counting as “Low Human Development” (an HDI lower than 0.550), 
fourteen are West African countries, and fifteen others are located elsewhere in 
Subsaharan Africa. A dismal outlook on the region, for sure. Countries such as Norway, 
Germany, and the USA, for comparison, have HDI of 0.954, 0.939, and 0.920, 
respectively.  
Figure 2: Conflict-related deaths since 1989 
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Uppsala Conflict Data Program 
 These two graphs are realized with data from the Uppsala Conflict Data 
Program, which maps locations, parties involved, number of deaths, and category for 
conflicts around the world since 1989. The first graph plots the number and type of 
conflict-related deaths by country. State-based conflict is between a government and 
another party (often civil wars or state vs terrorists/rebels), non-state conflict is between 
two non-state entities (often violence between clashing ethnic groups), and one-sided 
violence is between one party and civilians (typically terrorism or government 
massacres). Clearly, Nigeria has witnessed the most violence in recent decades among 
the four selected countries. Much of this is due to Boko Haram and other terrorist 
groups as well as ethnic conflicts. Taking the amount of deaths divided by population, 
as the second graph shows, the trends are the same. 
 Since World War II, the African continent has contained the most wars. In both 
1991 and 1999 alone, there were 18 simultaneous unique conflicts in Africa; between 
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1990 and 2005, 23 African countries were involved in conflicts. Some of these were 
vestiges from the Cold War, but the Cold War’s ending did not end the turmoil. Many of 
these conflicts are low in intensity, but can last for a long time. Even with a relatively low 
death toll as compared to a great war such as one of the World Wars, conflicts in 
African countries contribute to the destruction of means of production, turning of labor 
force towards the war, interrupted transportation and destruction of infrastructure, 
prevention of accessibility of areas due to mining, poison, etc, effect of brain drain, 
higher mortality rate, and much more. A study by Oxfam International, RAIAL and 
Saferworld found that a war, civil war, or rebellion leads to an average fall of 15% in 
economic activity. The direct and indirect costs of the numerous conflicts that plague 
Africa all play a part in its slowness to develop (Bardot, Christian, et al. 2009). 
 
Figure 3: Capital invested into colonial Africa 
 
African Empire Capital invested in millions of pounds 
English Africa 941,307 
French Africa 70,310 
Portuguese Africa 66,732 
Belgian Africa 143, 337 
Total 1,221,886 
 
Investment in Africa 
This chart, detailing the amounts of capital invested into the colonial powers’ African 
colonies, reveals a staggering difference between English Africa and French Africa. The 
British Empire invested more than ten times the amount that the French did (S. H. 
Frankel 1969). This appears to signify that the British colonial plan was not only to take 
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natural resources but also treat their colonies as a true investment, pouring in money in 
hopes to make a valuable return later on. This may also help explain why Anglophone 
African nations seem to be better off economically than Francophone African countries. 
Lest one think that the UK were a benevolent entity devoted to the needs of its colonies, 
it is valuable to know that “poverty reduction was not a priority for the UK, which 
typically tied around two-fifths of its aid to the purchase of British products and services. 
Successive French administrations tied an even larger proportion of their development 
assistance to French goods and accorded even less importance to poverty alleviation, 
giving less aid to least developed countries (LLDCs) than to upper middle-income 
African states (Cumming and Chafer 2011).” 
 In fact, French Africa received only 18% of French investments in colonies in 
1914, despite it being the largest part (by area) of the French empire. And what 
investment it did receive, it was mainly for railroads, irrigation, and drainage. Industry 
was ignored so as to not compete with mainland France (Bardot, Christian, et al. 2009). 
 
Figure 4: General Investment Suitability Model 
 
Country Population Weight Points %Pop in 
poverty 
Weight Points HDI Weight Points 
Ghana 28,102,471 0.5 0.69 0.24 0.5 -1.73 0.60 1 10.00 
Cote 
d’Ivoire 
26,260,582 0.5 0.65 0.46 0.5 -3.31 0.52 1 8.66 
Nigeria 203,452,505 0.5 5.00 0.70 0.5 -5.00 0.53 1 8.96 
Cameroon 25,640,965 0.5 0.63 0.30 0.5 -2.14 0.56 1 9.45 
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Country GDP 
per 
capita 
Weight Points GDP in 
$bn 
Weight Points Ease of 
Business 
rank 
Weight Points 
Ghana 4700 1.5 11.95 134.00 2 2.39 118 1.5 13.50 
Côte 
d’Ivoire 
3900 1.5 9.92 97.16 2 1.73 110 1.5 15.00 
Nigeria 5900 1.5 15.00 1121.00 2 20.00 131 1.5 11.06 
Cameroon 3700 1.5 9.41 89.54 2 1.60 167 1.5 4.31 
 
Country Politica
l 
Stabilit
y 
Weigh
t 
Point
s 
Corruptio
n Index 
Weigh
t 
Point
s 
Innovatio
n Index 
Weigh
t 
Point
s 
Ghana 2.59 1 10.00 41 1 10.00 25.3 1 9.88 
Côte 
d’Ivoire 
1.41 1 5.44 35 1 8.54 25.6 1 10.00 
Nigeria 0.56 1 2.16 27 1 6.59 23.9 1 9.34 
Cameroo
n 
1.42 1 5.48 25 1 6.10 23.9 1 9.34 
 
Country Total Points 
Ghana 66.68 
Côte d’Ivoire 56.63 
Nigeria 73.11 
Cameroon 44.17 
 
 Figure 4, the General Investment Suitability Model, is a simple and overarching 
model I made to weigh the selected West African countries against each other using a 
variety of indicators. These indicators include basic information such as population all 
the way to the aforementioned Human Development Index as well as the Corruption 
Perceptions Index. The model serves as a simple gauge of the general performance of 
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a country, factoring in development and political indicators as well as economic. This 
project is general and not dealing with a specific industry or product, but if it was, the 
model could be much more fine-tuned to include industry-specific data, export statistics 
to the country for a product’s harmonized code, and market size. 
 The model was calculated by picking a quantitative indicator of some value to the 
research at hand, assigning it a weight due to its relative importance, and then 
multiplying it by ten. The “winner” of a category receives the full ten points (if the weight 
is 1), and the other three countries divide their results by the winner’s to depict the 
results as relative to the best performer. The model is suggested to merely be an 
informative role in the comparison of these countries, not the final say. 
 Let us discuss, then, the results. The model shows anglophone Nigeria as being 
the country most suited for investment. This is in large part due to its gargantuan 
economy, shown by its GDP (purchasing power parity) of $1121 billion while the other 
three countries range from about $90-135 billion. Nigeria gains this hefty advantage by 
being oil-rich; in 2012 it was estimated that 95% of the country’s exports were crude oil 
(CIA World Factbook). Their population also completely dwarfs any of the other 
contenders. Despite performing poorly in percentage population in poverty and political 
stability, the strength of its economy carried it to first. 
 Ghana, also anglophone, pulled in comfortably in second. It won four categories, 
those being (lowest amount of) population in poverty, HDI, political stability, and 
Corruption Perceptions Index. Its strengths showcase an emphasis in the country of 
human development and stability, and it scored very respectfully in the solely economic 
indicators as well. Ghana seems to be a well-rounded country for our purposes. 
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 Côte d’Ivoire, in third, performs well in some business-oriented indicators such as 
Ease of Doing Business ranking and the Global Innovation Index. In other categories it 
performs adequately. Cote d’Ivoire is francophone Africa’s largest economy as well as 
the second fastest-growing African economy in since 2012 (U.S. Department of State 
2018). Yet even this flagship country could not surpass some of the superior 
anglophone countries in the region. 
 Finally, Cameroon finishes in fourth with a low score of 44. It scored the lowest in 
multiple categories, including GDP, GDP per capita, and Corruption Index. This 
indicates a lack of efficacy by the government to stimulate human and economic 
development. 
Figure 5: Average growth rate 
Country GDP 
growth 
rate 
2013 
GDP 
growth 
rate 
2014 
GDP 
growth 
rate 
2015 
GDP 
growth 
rate 
2016 
GDP 
growth 
rate 
2017 
GDP 
growth 
rate 
2018 
Avg 
GDP 
growth 
rate 
2013-
2018 
Ghana 7.31 2.90 2.18 3.45 8.14 6.26 5.04 
Côte 
d’Ivoire 
8.89 8.79 8.84 7.97 7.70 7.43 8.27 
Nigeria 6.67 6.31 2.65 -1.62 0.81 1.94 2.79 
Cameroon 5.04 5.88 5.65 4.65 3.55 4.06 4.81 
The World Bank 
 
Direct vs Indirect Rule 
 At the time of the colonization of Africa, both France and the U.K. were large 
empires that subjugated indigenous populations of Africa to expand their territory and 
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access to resources. Both amassed great quantities of land. Both ended slavery as they 
conquered further inland, but both upheld the view that the Europeans were inherently 
superior to their southern neighbors. However, one striking and crucial difference 
between the two empires’ approach to colonialism is that of direct and indirect rule. 
France was a proponent of direct rule, which argues for “European officials should call 
the shots for themselves by establishing and administering the rules and regulations for 
their African colonial subjects (American Historical Association 2018).” Indirect rule, 
championed by the British, used “existing tribal structures and traditions as conduits for 
establishing rules and regulations while English officials worked behind the scenes and 
could exercise a veto power (American Historical Association 2018).” 
 Was one philosophy right, and the other wrong? Did they both fail, or did they 
both succeed? Can any conclusion be drawn? From what I have researched, it seems 
that British (and therefore indirect) rule was more beneficial for the subjugated peoples 
as opposed to French (direct) rule. The “Postcolonial borderland legacies of Anglo-
French partition in West Africa” article I examined earlier has much to weigh in on this 
subject. Particularly, it noted that French policies were tougher on indigenous groups 
and that some voluntarily moved from French to British territory. Miles also writes that 
“direct rule affected the Mandara [an ethnic group split between northeastern Nigeria, 
northern Cameroon, and parts of Chad] in classical form: continuous undermining of the 
Mandara by the French (including an attempt to depose the Sultanate), while the British 
shored up the traditional rulers of ‘their’ Mandara.” Along Direct rule’s first form was the 
principle of assimilation. For France, the colonies were to become thoroughly French, 
and act “as mere provinces overseas (Boahen 1986).” The French colonial capital of 
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Saint Louis in Senegal was somewhat successfully assimilated and a “small percentage 
of West Africans came to participate in French national affairs (Ali-Dinar).” However, 
when this did not become realizable across all of their colonial territories, assimilation 
turned into subjugation via direct rule.  
 British indirect rule seemed to leave the country in a better position. La Verle 
Berry details the advantages of the system: “Traditional chiefs figured prominently in the 
system of indirect rule adopted by British authorities to administer their colonies in 
Africa. According to Frederick Lugard, architect of the policy, indirect rule was cost 
effective because it reduced the number of European officials in the field. By allowing 
local rulers to exercise direct administrative control over their people, opposition to 
European rule from the local population would be minimized. The chiefs, however, were 
to take instructions from their European supervisors. The plan, according to Lugard, had 
the further advantage of civilizing the natives, because it exposed traditional rulers to 
the benefits of European political organization and values. This "civilizing" process 
notwithstanding, indirect rule had the ultimate advantage of guaranteeing the 
maintenance of law and order (Berry 2015).” Additionally, the British African colonies 
were seen as completely separate entities to Great Britain itself. A clear example of this 
is the governance of Nigeria by British authorities. Mentioned in the Nigeria section 
earlier in this paper, the region was divided into Northern and Southern protectorates. 
The north being very traditional and Muslim, the British realized it could not force its 
values immediately on the people there, lest they revolt and drag the British into another 
armed conflict. For the most part, the British did not want to fight if they did not have to. 
While “the actual empire-builders in the French context were from the outset, military 
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men,” the “British expansion was conducted primarily by commercialists and resulted in 
more solid economic potential than the French endeavor (Crowder, 1990).” Highlighting 
the difference between the British and French approach to governing their colonies is 
A.J. Harding, the director of Nigerian affairs at the Colonial Office in the early 1900s. He 
noted that "direct government by impartial and honest men of alien race . . . never yet 
satisfied a nation long and . . . under such a form of government, as wealth and 
education increase, so do political discontent and sedition (Metz 1991)."  
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Conclusion: 
 My research has driven me to the conclusion that British imperialism ended up 
being more beneficial for its former colonies than French imperialism did for its own 
colonies. From present-day indicators measuring economic and political performance to 
historical details about the intricacies of direct and indirect rule, the research shows that 
countries previously under French rule are on average worse off than countries 
previously under British rule. The colonial policies and practices of a century ago are 
still affecting African nations today.  
 This is not to say that either colonial empire had the African region’s best 
interests in mind, nor that they were all that different; both powers used their colonies to 
enhance their economies, extend military control, build new spheres of influence, and 
compete with other European powers. Though both countries had differing views of 
colonial leadership, they both left their colonies in a rather disadvantaged state 
economically and politically. The nascent African countries were saddled with weak 
democracies, economies and infrastructure built around moving raw materials towards 
the coast and shipping them off to Europe (Bardot et al. 2009). 
 Of the four countries selected for general investment suitability, I would 
recommend that Ghana be the country most suited for investment. While Nigeria scored 
higher on my basic model, such a large portion of the economy is dependent on oil, 
which will steadily fall out of favor this century. Taking in as many factors into 
consideration as possible, Ghana, from my research, appears to be much more well-
rounded in both economic and political factors and thus more suited to investment. 
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Interviews: 
 As an additional resource, I attempted to find students from the countries I 
selected that attended the University of Akron to ask them a range of questions dealing 
with their perceptions of and experiences in their home countries. UA had only students 
from three countries represented in my project, and from those three only students from 
Nigeria and Ghana agreed to be interviewed. To balance out the interviews with a 
francophone perspective, I had my Burkinabe friend in France pass the questions along 
to one of his Cameroonian friends studying in Rennes. For Côte d’Ivoire, I had to resort 
to finding an Ivoirian from Reddit. 
 As conducting a far-reaching grand survey was not the purpose of this project, I 
intend for these interviews to only supplement some of the more impersonal information 
researched above. The responses can help demonstrate a personal, tangible side of the 
economic and political situations in the respective countries, but they clearly cannot be 
used to generalize. 
Where are you from in your country? 
Bunmi, graduate student at UA from Nigeria: I am originally from Ekiti State in the 
southwest of Nigeria. I lived in Lagos for about ten years, but then I lived closer to home 
in Ondo State for about eighteen to twenty years. I am Yuroba. 
 
Thelma, graduate student at UA from Ghana:  Accra, Ghana. 
 
Aurélie, a student at ENSAI in Rennes, France from Cameroon: J'ai grandi à Yaoundé. 
 
Abou, Visual Communication and Digital Creation teacher, from Côte d’Ivoire: Je suis 
né dans la capitale de la Côte d'Ivoire, Abidjan. 
 
What is your city or village like? 
Bunmi, Nigeria: Akure (city in Ondo State) could be kinda similar to Akron. I mean, 
population and infrastructure and those sorts of things. In terms of the people, of 
attitudes; people being laid-back and not too aggressive, they are similar to Akron in 
that way. 
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Thelma, Ghana: Greater Accra is the Capital City of Ghana. From all the 16 regions in 
Ghana, Accra is the most vibrant and distinctive region with 98% Head-Offices of 
different Companies, jobs and, a large trading center. The Head-Offices of Companies 
includes large banks, insurance companies, Electricity corporation, general post-Office, 
etc. Cost of Living (food, rent, utilities) is high in some parts of Accra and low in other 
parts. 
 
Aurélie, Cameroon: C’est une grande ville, la capitale politique et administrative du 
Cameroun. 
 
Abou, Côte d’Ivoire: Abidjan est la capitale économique de la Côte d'Ivoire avec environ 
5 millions d'habitants. 
 
What are the religious beliefs of the people in your community? 
Bunmi, Nigeria: Where I’m from originally (Ekite State), my village is maybe 90% 
Christian and another 5% are Muslim and the rest would be traditionalists. But in Akure, 
since it’s a larger city, it would be maybe 20% Muslims, maybe 70% Christians. Lagos, 
though, would probably be maybe 60% Christians, maybe 35% Muslims; few are 
traditionalists. For the most part, everyone gets along. When they are religious crises, 
they mostly come from different parts in the country, such as the north which is mostly 
Muslim. In the south, where it is mostly Christians, you don’t see as much of it. It’s 
there, but the crises will probably be more ethnic than religious. Although, you could say 
that religion cuts across mostly ethnic lines. 
 
Thelma, Ghana: More than half of the Ghana population are Christians and a small 
segment are from the Muslim and indigenous religion. 
 
Aurélie, Cameroon: Christianisme, islam, animisme. 
 
Abou, Côte d’Ivoire: Je ne pratique aucune religion en particulier, par contre j'ai des 
amis musulmans, chrétiens ou juifs… 
 
How do you view your country? Is it a good place? Bad? 
Bunmi, Nigeria: It’s a good place. Life is not nearly as expensive as it is here, and I have 
all of my family and friends there. But economically speaking, it’s tough to make a living 
unless you are heavily connected to the political class or something like that. I cannot 
say you need to be exceptional to make it because that doesn’t mean you are really 
going to make anything of yourself. The population is huge and there are many 
graduates each year. . . I feel good things about Nigeria, but there are many things that 
don’t necessarily enhance the quality of life. 
 
Thelma, Ghana: Living in Ghana is a beautiful experience and, a perfect place  for those 
seeking a unique  and a peaceful atmosphere. We are known for our extreme 
friendliness to tourists, visitors and citizens from other part of the world. Even though my 
country has its share of scandals and corruption within national and local politics, there 
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is no war. There are bad and good people in Ghana as it is in the case of every 
country.  
 
Aurélie, Cameroon: J'aime bien mon pays, il y fait bon vivre et le coût de la vie y est 
relativement bas. Cependant nous avons accumulé énormément de retard en 
développement social, économique et technologique. Ce qui peut rendre la vie 
quotidienne parfois difficile. 
 
Abou, Côte d’Ivoire: Je pense que la Côte d'Ivoire est un pays plein de richesses 
culturelles, avec une grande diversité en matières premières. Malheureusement la 
population souffre beaucoup du manque d'infrastructures solides et modernes, du 
manque de sérieux dans l'éducation de la jeunesse, du manque d'emploi et de travail 
pour les personnes actives. De la malveillance de la classe politique qui se sert de 
l'ignorance de la majeure partie de la population pour les leurrer et les tromper sur le 
partage de richesses et sur la voie du développement industrielle, économique et 
social. 
 
How do you view your country’s government? 
Bunmi, Nigeria: Government… that’s not a tricky one, the government is bad. We have 
a pretty high literacy rate but still a lot of people who go hungry. What politicians do in 
times of elections is share money and share food, and then people vote for them. 
Whether they are bad or good, nobody cares; they think, “Oh, well they’re all politicians, 
they’re all going to steal money anyway.” The corruption is decreasing a little with the 
advent of social media, but the government is horrible. They can’t initiate projects to 
save their life. 
 
Thelma, Ghana: Ghana is Africa's second-biggest gold and second-largest cocoa 
producer. It recently started producing oil, which has helped fuel economic growth.  The 
heavy concentration in the natural resources (including diamonds, manganese ore, 
bauxite) and commodities sectors has had an impact on the availability of jobs in the 
country. 
 
Aurélie, Cameroon: Je pense que le gouvernement de mon pays fait un travail moyen. 
Je veux dire que les membres du gouvernement font ce qu'ils peuvent pour éviter de 
sombrer dans des crises, mais ne font pas plus que ça pour aider le pays à se 
développer. 
 
Abou, Côte d’Ivoire: Le gouvernement de la Côte d'Ivoire compte en général des 
dizaines de ministres qui n'ont qu'une chose en tête: profiter de leur poste pour se 
remplir les poches le plus possible et le plus vite possible. Avec des mascarades de 
constructions parsemées ça et là pour couvrir leurs enrichissements personnels. 
 
How do you view your country’s economy? 
Bunmi, Nigeria: Industries are almost nonexistent. We have the banking industry and 
telecommunications, so it’s difficult getting jobs because how many people could they 
possibly employ. There’s not a lot of cash to start a business, interest rates are on the 
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average 25%, which is crazy, and on top of that you will probably not get a loan if you 
apply and you don’t have collateral. There is no credit system. Also, there is the human 
factor. Doing business in a country where most people are hungry, that is a huge risk. 
It’s difficult for young people to start businesses or simply find jobs, so that’s why many 
young Nigerians run away. On the whole, I don’t think Nigeria’s economy is that good. I 
don’t think it’s as good as Ghana’s. 
 
Thelma, Ghana: Ghana intends to achieve its goals of accelerated economic growth 
and improved quality of life for all its citizens by reducing poverty through private 
investment and establishing the need for economic diversification to create more and 
better jobs. 
 
Aurélie, Cameroon: Je pense que le Cameroun a les ressources et les compétences 
nécessaires pour afficher de meilleurs indicateurs économiques que ce qu'on affiche 
actuellement. Si le gouvernement était plus sérieux et les camerounais plus travailleurs 
on pourrait faire partie des pays émergents actuellement. 
 
Abou, Côte d’Ivoire: Il y a effectivement des investisseurs qui viennent opérer en Côte 
d'Ivoire, puisque le pays est en phase de développement et qu'il y a encore un certain 
nombre d'activité à explorer. Par exemple, ce n'est seulement que en 2020 que le 
secteur des médias de l'audiovisuel a été libéralisé. Avant cela il n'y avait que la chaine 
de télévision de l'Etat de Côte d'Ivoire RTI (Radiodiffusion Télévision Ivoirienne) qui 
diffusait sur les ondes. Cela rendait les activités en matière de production audiovisuelle 
difficile. Alors que dans la plupart des pays démocratiques, il existe plusieurs chaines 
de télévision depuis des années, la Côte d'Ivoire ouvre maintenant en 2020 les 
nouvelles chaines de TV… 
 
How do you view the future of your country? 
Bunmi, Nigeria: I won’t say the future is necessarily going to be bright. I’ll say there will 
be some changes. With the rise of social media, communication is much easier and 
quicker, and a lot of new information is available to people. For instance if someone 
speaking out against the government is thrown in jail, a lot of people will shout and 
make noise. There will be an outcry, maybe for two weeks. But it’s different from what it 
was ten or fifteen years ago when nobody would even bother. The trend is on the up. I 
cannot tell you how long things will take, but things are changing. 
 
Thelma, Ghana: I think the future of Ghana is very bright and hopeful. 
 
Aurélie, Cameroon: Je pense que dans l'avenir la situation ne pourra s'améliorer que si 
il ya un réel éveil de conscience chez les camerounais. Je suis assez pessimiste sur 
l'avenir du Cameroun également à cause des tensions tribales qu'il ya entre les 
populations.  
 
Abou, Côte d’Ivoire: Je pense que la Côte d'Ivoire peut s'offrir un avenir radieux si 
seulement les tares et les difficultés sont relevés et qu'on y apporte des solutions 
durables. 
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Do you want to return to your country to live and work or stay here? 
Bunmi, Nigeria: I would actually love to go to Nigeria to live and work, but not yet. First I 
need money and experience. If I’m going to Nigeria, I want to start my own business. 
 
Thelma, Ghana: I will love to work for some time after my studies with the university of 
Akron before leaving for Ghana. 
 
Aurélie, Cameroon: J'aimerais commencer ma carrière en France et sur le long terme 
rentrer m'installer au Cameroun. 
 
Abou, Côte d’Ivoire: Après mes études à Paris, j'ai décidé de venir développer mes 
activités dans mon pays d'origine. 
 
Did you ever feel threatened by a conflict when you were in your country? 
Bunmi, Nigeria: Yeah, that used to happen all the time. There was sometimes ethnic 
strife; maybe not as pronounced where I used to live, but you could hear on the radio 
sometimes that groups of people were rioting or fighting at a place that you drive by for 
work. My father is retired now but he was a lifelong career politician. They almost 
burned down the house a couple of times, the opposing party sent thugs to my dad’s 
house. The violence is there. 
 
Thelma, Ghana: I never felt threatened by conflicts when I was in Ghana. It’s a peaceful 
country- there’s a high degree of media freedom and all types of freedom without 
significant restrictions. 
 
Aurélie, Cameroon: Non je ne me suis jamais sentie menacée au Cameroun. 
 
Abou, Côte d’Ivoire: Non, pas que je ne me souvienne. 
 
How do you view anglophone/francophone West Africa? 
Bunmi, Nigeria: I think the English-speaking countries would probably be performing 
better overall. I know there is a lot of poverty in Cameroon and Cote d’Ivoire. Ghana is 
pretty stable because of a crazy revolution and change of government that helped them. 
Nigeria is lucky because we have a lot of oil. Togo is a really poor place as well. 
Senegal is maybe not thriving, but they do ok, on the level of Ghana I think. I think what 
really helps the anglophone countries is that much of the world speaks English, so they 
can do business with South Africa or America. The French-speaking countries are more 
limited. 
 
Thelma, Ghana: Even though there’s high level of scams and crimes in Nigeria 
especially against foreign travelers, the Nigerian government, police and the entire 
criminal justice administration system are trying to refine and deploy improved 
strategies to resolve the country’s current challenges of security and safety. I don’t know 
much about francophone countries. But what I can say is that, Ghana has close 
economic ties with them and their relationship is mutually beneficial. 
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Aurélie, Cameroon: Je pense que l'Afrique occidentale francophone et anglophone ont 
les mêmes problèmes : l'importance du secteur informel dans l'économie, 
l'analphabétisme, l'instabilité politique, la corruption. Toutefois, à mon avis la jeunesse 
d'Afrique occidentale anglophone est beaucoup plus dynamique et entreprenante que 
celle d'Afrique francophone. Je pense que la fuite des cerveaux est aussi moins 
importante chez les anglophones.  
 
Abou, Côte d’Ivoire: En générale, l'Afrique francophone souffre de certains complexes 
par rapport à leur pays colonisateur alors que les Anglophones sont plus libres dans 
leurs esprits et leurs visions de développement… Les pays francophones pour la 
plupart partagent la même devise monétaire : XOF ou le Franc CFA ( rattaché à la 
France ) alors que les Anglophone ont pour la plupart leurs propres devises. Ce qui 
encourage plus facilement leur liberté économique… Les cultures africaines, quelques 
soient leurs diversités, nous rassemble sous une même identité. 
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